ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he corporate scandals of the early 21 st century seriously affected investor confidence in the capital markets. In an effort to address these problems, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Section 404 of SOX is considered by many as the most important aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 . Under Section 404, the management and a firm's external independent auditor are required to report on the effectiveness of the firm's internal control on financial reporting. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all U.S. public companies that are considered as accelerated filers to report on the effectiveness of their internal control over financial reporting for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004 . Accelerated filers are generally defined as companies with at least $75 million in public equity float. The SEC also requires foreign large accelerated filers to provide both management and auditor Section 404 reports for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2006 . Large accelerated filers are generally defined as firms with public equity float of at least $700 million. Non-accelerated filers are still not yet required to conduct Section 404 review given the high compliance costs.
Several studies have examined the increase in audit fees due to the expanded audit effort required under a Section 404 review. For example, Eldridge and Kealey (2005) find an average increase of 100% in audit fees among banks, and Raghunandan and Rama (2006) report an average increase of 86% in audit fees among industrial firms in 2004. Chan et al. (2008) find an average increase of 74% in audit fees among foreign firms listed on major U.S. exchanges in their first year of Section 404 compliance. Most interestingly, Benoit (2006) and Chan et al. (2008) also report that there are significant increases in audit fees even for the non-accelerated filers that are not yet required to comply with Section 404. These findings suggest that audits are generally more extensive for all firms given the stricter regulatory environment since 2004.
There is a substantial increase in the number of accounting restatements in recent years. Many have attributed the increased number of restatements to the general change in audit efforts since the passage of SOX, and Section 404 in particular (Solomon 2007 This study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and research objectives. Section 3 describes the research design and summarizes the empirical findings. Section 4 presents concluding comments.
RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Prior studies have examined different aspects of accounting restatements. (2006) find significant audit delays due to Section 404 reviews. Chan, Farrell, and Lee (2008) report that firms reporting ineffective internal controls under Section 404 often also have accounting restatements caused by the material internal control weaknesses. Chan, Lee, and Seow (2008) also find that even with the significant increase in audit fees, management and auditors failed to identify material internal control weaknesses of some firms. As a result, management and auditors have to amend their Section 404 opinions concluding that firms indeed have ineffective internal controls. Moreover, firms often have to restate their financial statements because of the amended Section 404 opinions. In addition, Section 404 has significant effects on the audit efforts among smaller firms that do not have yet to comply with Section 404. Benoit (2006) 3 . We also examine if restatements with positive financial statement effects are more likely to be reported sooner than those with negative financial statement effects since management are more likely to report good news early and bad news late (Bagnoll, Kross, and Watts 2002).
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS
A sample of restatements disclosed in 2000-2007 is collected from the Audit Analytics database. Restatements related to accounting rule application failures, financial fraud, irregularities and misrepresentations, and errors related to accounting and clerical applications are included in our sample. A firm is considered as having a Big four/five auditor if the firm has a Big four/five auditor at the time of restatement disclosure. Data from Audit Analytics also reports if the restatements have net positive or negative effects to financial statement numbers. We define the restatement period as the number of calendar days between the beginning date and the ending date of the restatement period. We also define restatement disclosure lag as the number of calendar days between the ending date of the restatement period and the restatement disclosure date 4 . The restatement disclosure date is the earliest SEC filing date or press release related to the restatement as reported in Audit Analytics. 2000  476  9  467  255  221  2001  620  39  581  346  274  2002  737  47  690  452  285  2003  930  76  854  615  315  2004  1061  87  974  662  399  2005  1619  191  1428  941  678  2006  1847  218  1629  725  1122  2007  1301  135  1166  503 798 a: number of accounting restatements reported in Audit Analytics. b: number of accounting restatements with net positive effects to financial statements. c: number of accounting restatements with net negative effects to financial statements. d: number of accounting restatements from firms audited by Big four/five accounting firms. e: number of accounting restatements from firms audited by non-Big four/five accounting firms.
A total of 8,591 restatements are included in our final sample. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the restatements. The number of restatements disclosed in each year has increased gradually from 476 in 2000 to 1,061 in 2004 with a big jump to 1,619 in 2005 probably due to the effects of Section 404 review. About 91% of the restatements have net negative effects on financial statement numbers. The total number of restatements associated with Big four/five or non-Big four/five auditors are about the same. One interesting pattern is that there are more restatements associated with Big four/five auditors in 2000-05. However, the trend has reversed in 2006-07 with more restatements associated with non-Big four/five auditors. This is consistent with the findings in the literature that Section 404 reviews among larger firms has caused more audit efforts even among smaller firms that are not required to comply with Section 404. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for restatement periods and restatement disclosure lag. Panel A shows that the length of the restatement periods has increased in recent years and the increase is larger among restatements associated with Big four/five auditors. Panel B suggests that the time lag between the restatement ending period and restatement disclosure date has reduced in recent years. Comparing the disclosure lags between the restatements associated with Big four/five and non-Big four/five auditors, restatements associated with Big four/five auditors always have a shorter average disclosure lag. 2000  529  521  538  2001  468  490  440  2002  525  585  429  2003  539  584  450  2004  602  684  467  2005  747  883  559  2006  714  1063  489  2007  651  882 286  244  335  2001  316  277  366  2002  267  245  303  2003  314  307  327  2004  288  281  301  2005  234  205  273  2006  267  255  275  2007 289 281 294 a: accounting restatements from firms audited by Big four/five accounting firms. b: accounting restatements from firms audited by non-Big four/five accounting firms.
We also conduct regression analysis on the restatement period and restatement disclosure lag using the following model: Table 3 reports the results of the regression analysis on the restatement period. Model (1) shows that the coefficients on Year and Big four/five are both significantly positive. Positive Effect is added in Model (2) and the coefficient is negative and significant. These findings suggest that restatements disclosed in more recent years are generally more serious problem in term of the length of the restatement periods. The results also show that restatements associated with Big four/five auditors have longer restatement periods as Big four/five auditors could be more forceful in restatement decisions. The negative coefficient on Positive Effect indicates that restatements with positive effects on financial statements covered shorter restatement periods than that of the restatements with negative effects. Models (3) and (4) re-examine the analysis using an indicator variable, Year 04_07, for the 2004-07 period. Consistent with the findings in Models (1) and (2), the coefficients on Year 04_07 in Models (3) and (4) are significantly positive. This suggests that restatements disclosed in 2004-07 have longer restatement period when compared to the restatements disclosed in 2000-03. .58*** **, *** Significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively in two-tailed test. Restatement disclosure lag = # of calendar days from the end of the restatement period to the restatement disclosure date. Table 4 reports the regression results on restatement disclosure lag. In Models (1) and (2), the coefficients on Year, Big four/five, and Positive Effect are all negative and statistically significant. This indicates that the restatements are disclosed more timely in more recent years and the disclosures are even more timely among firms with Big four/five auditors. This is consistent with the stronger regulatory environment in more recent years and
